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Priorities and Sequencing in Privatization:
Theory and Evidence from the Czech Republic
1.  Introduction
While privatization of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) has been one of the most
important aspects of economic transition from a centrally planned to a market system, no
transition economy has privatized all of its SOEs simultaneously. Even in countries such as
the Czech Republic, Estonia, Russia, and the Ukraine that strove to privatize their SOEs
rapidly, the privatization process consisted of a sequence of moves, with some firms being
privatized earlier than others. The lack of simultaneous privatization of all SOEs raises the
issue of whether governments strategically sequence privatization. An answer to this
question is important for understanding the behavior of governments and firms in the
transition economies and for establishing whether empirical studies of the effects of
privatization need to take into account the potential selection bias brought about by
strategic sequencing. This question is also relevant for countries such as India, China, and
Mexico that have large state sectors and are currently pursuing privatization.
This is the first study in the literature that examines both theoretically and
empirically how competing government objectives may give rise to different privatization6
strategies.
1  To obtain testable predictions about which factors affect the sequencing of
privatization, we develop new, and adapt existing, theoretical models of sequencing
strategies for the following government objectives: (i) maximizing sales revenue from
privatization and/or public goodwill from transferring shares of firms to voters, (ii)
increasing economic efficiency, and (iii) reducing political costs due to layoffs. Regarding
the maximization of privatization revenues,
2 we show that it is a reasonable strategy for a
government pursuing this objective to privatize more profitable firms first. The same
outcome will arise if the government’s objective is to generate public goodwill from free
or subsidized transfers of shares of firms to citizens.
3  Regarding efficiency, one strategy is
to privatize inefficient firms first so as to induce major restructuring and improvement in
enterprise performance.
4  Assuming that private firms are more efficient in responding to
information, the government may also want to privatize firms in industries that face the
greatest uncertainty in terms of demand and cost shocks (Glaeser and Scheinkman, 1996).
Finally, the government may be concerned about losing voter support due to layoffs
brought about by restructuring of privatized firms. In this context Shleifer and Vishny
(1994) argue that the interaction between efficiency and political concerns may lead the
government to privatize more profitable firms first. We in turn develop a political cost
model in which profitable firms are likely to have fewer layoffs, implying that a
government concerned with unemployment will prefer to privatize these firms first.
                                                       
1 For a recent comprehensive survey of the entire transition literature, see Roland (2000).
2 This was, for instance, an important objective in heavily indebted Hungary. It also appears to have been
an important factor in determining privatization outcomes in India.
3 Transfers of shares were, for instance, undertaken in voucher programs in the Czech Republic, Estonia,
Kazakhstan, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Ukraine.
4 The strategy of privatizing the inefficient firms first may also lead to a reduction of the subsidy burden
and hence have a positive effect on the budget.7
Using firm-level data from the Czech Republic to test which of these above
objectives were pursued by a government that carried out one of the most extensive mass
privatization programs, we find strong evidence that the Czech government privatized
more profitable firms first. This outcome is consistent with the government placing priority
on maximizing privatization revenues and public goodwill, as well as on minimizing
political costs of unemployment.  Testing between these theories, we find that labor
market conditions were not an important determinant of privatization, allowing us to rule
out the hypothesis that political costs of unemployment were an important priority for the
Czech government. This last result is not altogether surprising in view of the strikingly low
unemployment rate in this economy.
5 We also find that the privatization process was
consistent with the Glaeser and Scheinkman (1996) definition of efficiency -- firms likely
to be more responsive to changes in demand conditions were privatized first.  Our
empirical results are also consistent with Shleifer and Vishny’s (1994) argument that
groups within and outside the government favoring efficiency will advocate privatization
of profitable firms first because this will enable the government to stop the flow of
subsidies to these firms. These conclusions provide insight into privatization strategies that
may be adopted when different, sometimes competing, objectives are pursued by the
government.
Our results have important implications for studies evaluating the effect of
privatization on firm performance. A number of such studies measure gains from
                                                       
5 In the first half of the 1990s the unemployment rate in the Czech Republic remained low (3-4%) and
stable relative to other Central European economies. Our results refer to labor market conditions just
before the large scale privatization program began and thus do not reflect the effect of this program.
However, if the Czechoslovakia government was always concerned about the political costs of8
privatization by comparing the performance of privatized firms to those firms still in the
public sector.
6 However, such comparisons are only valid if firms are randomly chosen for
privatization. For example, if the government selectively privatizes better firms (as our
results suggest), it would not be surprising to see these privatized firms perform better
than firms that remain public, even if privatization has no effect on firm performance.
Thus our results suggest that it is necessary to investigate the possibility of selection bias
in such an evaluation. A similar statistical problem arises in studies examining the effect on
firm performance of the length of time since privatization. Our result that more profitable
firms are likely to be privatized early implies that unobserved firm characteristics that
make the firms more profitable may be correlated with the length of time the firm has been
privatized.
A few studies have considered selection bias in privatization.  For example,
LaPorta and Lopez de Silanes (1997) address this problem by using SOEs in the same
sector as a comparison group, but this method does not account for selection biases due to
firm-specific characteristics. In their analysis of the restructuring of Russian shops after
privatization, Barberis, Boycko, Shleifer, and Tsukanova (1996) allow for the possibility
that the new ownership structure is endogenous, but they  assume that privatization is
exogenous.
7  Frydman, Gray, Hessel, and Rapaczynski (1999) estimate the effects of
privatization on performance and control for selectivity in privatization using fixed effects
                                                                                                                                                                    
unemployment, and the low unemployment rate before privatization reflects this concern, then we will not
be able to find a significant effect of labor market conditions.
6 For an earlier survey see Vining and Boardman (1992). Studies investigating the effects of privatization
include Galal et al. (1994), Estrin (1994), Kikeri et al. (1994), Megginson et al. (1994), Gordon and Li
(1995), Boubakri and Cosset (1997), Claessens and Djankov (1999), Gray and Holle (1997), and Djankov
and Pohl (1998).
7 To see this, note that (i) in choosing their sample they stratify on privatization status and (ii) they later
analyze only privatized firms without correcting for selection bias.9
methods. This approach provides unbiased estimates if the selection effect is time
invariant, while time changing selection effects can be controlled by combining our
modeling approach with Heckman (1979).
8  Both the fixed effects approach of Frydman et
al. (1999) and our approach (combined with Heckman, 1979) have advantages and
disadvantages and thus may be viewed as complementary.
9
Our paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the testable
predictions of models where the government is concerned with each of the following
objectives: maximizing privatization revenues and/or public goodwill from subsidized
share transfers, increasing efficiency, and minimizing political costs of unemployment. To
investigate sales revenue maximization, we use a model with asymmetric information that
generates predictions about the sequencing of privatization, hereafter the GHS1 model.
We discuss next the decision of a government maximizing public goodwill from free
transfers of shares to the public, hereafter the GHS2 model. In the following subsections
we describe two efficiency theories: a model of privatization sequencing aimed at
maximizing static efficiency, hereafter the GHS3 model, and Glaeser and Scheinkman’s
(1996) model of optimal sequencing, hereafter the GS model. Finally, we consider two
political cost theories: first, Shleifer and Vishny’s (1994) model of the
                                                       
8 Frydman et al. (1999) also consider time changing factors, but assume that the timing of privatization,
conditional on being chosen for privatization, is exogenous.
9 See Heckman and Robb (1985), pages 218 and 236 for example.10
impact of privatization on restructuring, hereafter the SV model, and then a model that
analyzes the effect of firm characteristics on layoffs after privatization, hereafter the GHS4
model. In Section 3 we discuss the institutional framework for the privatization process in
the Czech Republic, focusing on the two waves of the large-scale privatization program.
(This program was used to privatize virtually all medium-sized and large firms.) In Section
4 we use data on the population of medium-sized and large manufacturing firms in the
Czech Republic to test the predictions of the theoretical models and investigate the
priorities of the government. We conclude the paper in Section 5.
2.2 Theories of Privatization
Below we discuss theories of government behavior which may give rise to different
privatization outcomes. We note that it can also be argued that buyers and/or managers of
firms have some impact on determining which firms are privatized. In that case it would
not be possible to identify the government’s sequencing decision as the privatization
outcomes may be a result of  joint bargaining between the government and buyers or
managers. In the Czech Republic however, participation in the privatization programs was
not voluntary nor could managers and buyers control whether a firm was to be included in
the first or second waves of privatization. While firms may have lobbied, the government
had to choose which firms were to be privatized in the different waves, and there were
several instances when firms’ proposals were rejected.
10
2.2.1 Maximizing privatization revenues (GHS1)
                                                       
10 See Kotrba (1995) for a discussion of the privatization process.11
We first develop a model of the maximization of privatization revenues based on
asymmetric information between the government and buyers. We assume that the
government knows the true value or profitability of the firm, but buyers (external
investors) do not.
11  Under the conditions of this model we find that there exists a unique
pure strategy equilibrium in which the government sells the more profitable firm first.
12
Our model predicts that the probability of being privatized will be an increasing function of
the profitability of the firm.
We use a two-period setting with two firms A and B, many buyers and one seller.
The firms’ profit is given by  } , { , q q q = Q ˛ B A , where q can take on either of the two
values with  . q q >  The two firms can be of the same type or of different types, where the
type of the firm is denoted by its profit. While the government observes the profitability of
the firms, the buyers do not. The government’s objective is to maximize privatization
revenues. We assume that all buyers have the same information about the distribution of
types of the firms. To simplify issues we assume that different groups of buyers bid in each
period, although second period buyers observe the quality of the first period firm. Since
there is uncertainty about firm type, the value of the firm to all buyers is given by the
expected profits from the firm.
13 Hence, the government is able to extract all the rents
                                                       
11 This assumption is applicable to most centrally planned economies since managers of SOEs usually
report directly to the relevant government ministry. Note that the empirical implication of this assumption
is that firms being chosen for privatization may have characteristics that are unobservable to buyers, but
are correlated with the value or profitability of the firms.  Since these characteristics are also likely to be
unobservable to researchers, the model predicts the selection bias problem for evaluating the effect of
privatization raised in the introduction.
12 See Gupta (2000) for a general treatment of this topic.
13 This represents a common value auction since we assume that the value of the firm is the same for all
buyers.12
from the informational asymmetry, and obtain a price from the sale that is equal to the
expected value of the firm.
14
The timing of the game is as follows: the types (profits) of the firms are assigned,
B A q q ,  where  ; , }, , { B A i i = ˛ q q q  the government observes the types and picks firm A or
firm B to be sold in the first period, and the firm is sold at a price equal to its expected
value; in the second period, buyers observe the type of the first firm and then bid for the
second firm.
Let A be the firm being sold first and B the firm sold in the second period. We
specify the following probability distribution for the firms’ profits:
a q q q q q q q q = = = = = = ) , ( ) , ( B A B A p p , and
b q q q q q q q q = = = = = = ) , ( ) , ( B A B A p p , where  ) 1 , 0 ( , ˛ b a .
Next, we calculate the prices offered for each firm under the two sets of beliefs of
the buyers regarding the sequence in which the firms will be sold by the government.
(a) Buyers believe that the government will sell the better firm first.
The first period price (price offered for the firm sold in the first period) is the expected
value of the firm given buyers’ beliefs and is equal to
) ( 2
) 2 (
) | ( 1 b a




= = ‡ p E B A A (2.1.1)
since the probability that the first firm will be of high value given the buyer’s beliefs that
the government will sell the better firm first is given by a + 2b. Similarly, given these
                                                       
14 Using a second price auction framework, Gupta (2000) shows that the equilibrium result below will
hold even if buyers have some private information about the value of the firms.13
beliefs the first firm will be of low value if and only if both firms are of low value and the
corresponding probability is equal to a.
In the second period buyers will observe the quality of the first firm. Correspondingly, the
second period price (the price for the second firm) conditional on the value of the first firm
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When the second period buyers observe the first firm is of high value, given their beliefs
about the sequencing strategy, with probability a the second firm is high value as well
while with probability 2b the second firm is of low value. However, when they observe
that the first firm is of low value, given their beliefs about the government’s sequencing
strategy, they assume that the second firm is of low value as well.
We use these prices to check whether it is an equilibrium strategy for the government to
sell the better firm first under these buyer beliefs.
Under these buyer beliefs, the respective payoffs in present value over both periods
to the government from i) selling the better firm first or ii) deviating and selling the worse
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where d £ 1 is the discount rate. As can be seen from the above expression, the payoff
from selling the good firm first is greater than the payoff from deviating; hence the optimal14
strategy for the government, given that the buyers believe that it will sell the best firm first,
is to follow. To see the intuition behind this result suppose that the buyers believe that the
government will lead with the better firm, and the government deviates and sells the worse
firm first instead. Given their beliefs, the buyers in the second period will then observe the
low quality of the first firm and conclude that the second firm is of equal or lower quality.
As a result, the second period price will be lower than if the government had kept to the
strategy of selling the better firm first. Thus, when the buyers believe that the better firm
will be sold first, it is an equilibrium strategy for the government to lead with the best firm.
Next we show that this argument does not extend to the case where buyers believe that
the government will sell the worst firm first.
(b) Buyers believe that the government will sell the worse firm first.
As in the previous case, the first period price is the expected value of the firm given
buyers’ beliefs and is equal to
) ( 2
) 2 (
) | ( 1 b a
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The second period price depends on the realization of  A q  (the observed value of the first
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If the buyers believe the government will sell the worse firm first, then the respective
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As can be seen from equation (2.1.6), the payoff from deviating is higher than the payoff
from following and the government will always choose to deviate when the buyers believe
that it will sell the worst firm first. Hence, it cannot be an equilibrium for the buyers to
believe that the government will sell the best firm last. The intuition behind this result is
similar to that of the previous case. Suppose that buyers believe that the government will
lead with the worst firm, and instead the government deviates and sells the better firm
first. In the second period, buyers observe the quality of the first firm and conclude that
the second firm is of even higher quality. Second period buyers pay a higher price than
they would if the government had sold the worse firm first; hence, under these buyer
beliefs it is always better for the government to deviate. Thus the pure strategy equilibrium
in this model is for the government to lead with the more profitable firm.
In our empirical work we use several measures of firm profitability to test whether
the government in the Czech Republic privatized more profitable firms first, as predicted
by this revenue maximization model. The predictions of this model and the other
government objectives discussed below are summarized in Table 1 in Section 4. Next we
discuss the government’s objectives when shares of firms are transferred at a highly
subsidized rate to citizens, as has occurred in many transition economies.16
2.2.2 Maximizing public goodwill (GHS2)
In this section we focus on the voucher privatization method undertaken, for
example, in the Czech Republic, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia,
Ukraine and other transition economies, where highly subsidized shares of firms were
transferred to all or a subset of interested citizens. In the Czech Republic the great
majority of larger firms were privatized under the voucher program. Under this program a
portion of the firms’ shares (approximately 45%) were distributed to citizens at a highly
subsidized rate. A similar fraction of the remaining shares were sold at market prices, with
the residual shares (between 10-15%) often being retained by the government. While our
revenue maximization model suggests that the government would want to sell the best
firms first if it focused on the fraction of shares sold at market prices, it is likely that the
government will also be concerned about the public’s reaction to the subsidized shares.  It
is thus reasonable to assume that a government undertaking voucher privatization will be
concerned about public support for the transition in general, and for the government itself
in particular. As a result, we conjecture that voters prefer to acquire shares in profitable
firms and that the government could maximize support for itself and the transition by
privatizing the better firms first. The extent to which the government cares about voter
support will then determine whether it sequences the sale of firms to maximize public
goodwill.
An interesting question that arises is how the government would behave if it were
liquidity constrained and faced a hard budget constraint. If the government privatized
firms simply by selling all their shares at market prices, it could maximize its short term
revenue by selling the best firms first. In particular, if the market price reflects the present17
discounted value of current and future profits, the government can gain access to the
expected future profits of the best firms by selling them in the current period. In other
words, profitable firms can be sold at high prices that in the short-run more than offset a
loss of current revenues to the government. On the other hand, if the government
privatized all shares of firms by transferring them to the public at greatly reduced prices,
privatizing the worst firms first would best ease the government’s liquidity problems.
Since the program we are examining is a combination of transferring a fraction of shares at
reduced prices and selling another fraction at market prices, we conclude that the effect of
a hard budget constraint in the Czech case is a priori indeterminate.
Since a privatizing government may also be concerned with economic efficiency,
we next discuss the outcomes that should be observed if the government places a priority
on increasing static Pareto efficiency.
2.2.3  Maximizing static Pareto efficiency (GHS3)
The centrally planned system strove to generate full employment in the economy.
Moreover, firms were heavily penalized for under-fulfilling the plan but virtually not at all
for hoarding excess labor. As a result, SOEs operating under central planning were
generally viewed as operating with surplus labor in the sense that the removal of some
workers would not, on average, reduce output. Since surplus workers could make a
positive contribution to profits elsewhere in the economy, a natural strategy for achieving
greater efficiency from both the private (profit maximizing) and social (GDP maximizing)
standpoints would be to privatize first firms in which the wage rate greatly exceeds the18
marginal product of labor.
15  Since these firms are likely to have the most surplus labor,
they will realize the greatest efficiency gains for themselves and for the economy by being
privatized.
16  An empirical prediction in this context is that firms in which there is a large
gap between the wage and the marginal product of labor should be privatized earlier. 
In our data set we observe the average and not the marginal product of labor in
each firm. Since the two productivities are positively correlated, and in the class of
production functions such as Cobb-Douglas they are proportional to one another, we use
the difference between the average product of labor and the average wage in each firm as
a proxy variable in testing whether the above mentioned static inefficiency has guided the
sequencing of privatization.
2.2.4 Maximizing efficiency through informational gains of privatization (GS)
Glaeser and Scheinkman (GS) have been the only authors to address directly the
issue of sequencing the sale of firms and industries to improve economic efficiency.
17 In
their model, privatization increases efficiency by increasing the firms’ acquisition of, and
responsiveness to, information. In this context, GS make specific inter- and intra-industry
predictions regarding which firms and industries are likely to benefit the most from early
privatization. The authors assume that while cost and demand shocks are unobserved or
                                                       
15  In the context of efficiency, Lau, Qian, and Roland (2000) discuss China’s dual-track approach, which
incorporates market liberalization and continued enforcement of the existing plan, as a means of
achieving pareto-improving efficiency. The dual track approach would have been difficult to implement in
the transition economies of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union for a number of reasons: first,
retaining a command economy may not have been feasible in the post-Communist political climate;
second, governments would not have been able to guarantee enforcement of this approach given the
collapse of product and input markets which followed the disintegration of the Soviet system.
16 Kikeri, Nellis, and Shirley (1992) also argue that from the viewpoint of restructuring, the worst firms
are the best candidates for early privatization.
17 As we discuss below, Shleifer and Vishny’s (1994) model also provides an indirect recommendation for19
ignored by the government, private firms observe the true level of demand and cost.
18  In
their model, a state-owned enterprise produces a fixed level of output based on the
expected value of demand and cost, while private owners observe the true values and
adjust their production when demand and cost conditions change. Thus the primary
advantage of private ownership is greater responsiveness to information, and the GS
model predicts that privatization should begin where demand or cost volatility is the
greatest.
GS compare upstream firms to downstream firms within an industry, as well as
downstream industries to upstream industries. They find that when demand uncertainty
dominates cost uncertainty, downstream industries should be privatized before upstream
industries.
19  In an industry with a private retail sector, they find that privatization
downstream dominates privatization upstream when the two sectors are similar in size and
cost volatility. GS also note that the informational gains from privatization may be offset
by a loss of consumer surplus if firms with significant market power are privatized and
allowed to engage in monopoly pricing.
20  For the purpose of our analysis their model
suggests that firms in downstream industries, firms facing demand or cost volatility, and
firms with low monopoly power are the best candidates for privatization.
In the empirical section we test whether downstream industries and industries
which were subjected to the greatest demand shocks were privatized first. We also test if
                                                                                                                                                                    
increasing efficiency by the choice of firms to be privatized.
18 It may not be necessary to assume that the government ignores these shocks as long as private firms
observe these shocks with greater accuracy than the government.
19 This prediction is not straightforward when the industry is both upstream and faces high levels of
demand and cost volatility. However, due to the collapse of the Soviet-era common markets, demand
volatility is considered to be the main source of uncertainty confronting firms in the former transition
economies.
20 There is a large body of literature which investigates the issue of whether monopolies create20
the market share of a firm affects the probability of it being privatized early, both as a test
of this theory and of the revenue maximization hypothesis. In the revenue maximization
hypothesis however, firms with high market share should be privatized first since this
variable may also act as a proxy for profitability. Thus the market share variable also
allows us to compare the relative priority placed on revenue versus efficiency objectives.
Finally, governments considering privatization in economies with large public
sectors may be concerned about the fate of the surplus workers generally present in most
public firms. Below we discuss how the government’s concerns about unemployment may
affect the type of firms selected for early privatization.
2.2.5  Increasing allocative efficiency in a bargaining model (SV)
Shleifer and Vishny (SV) use a bargaining model to analyze the role of managers
and politicians in determining whether privatization improves efficiency in terms of
resource allocation. Their work also has implications for the sequencing of privatization.
SV assume that the government is concerned with employment and makes transfers to
firms in the form of subsidies in exchange for the firm retaining surplus labor. The authors
find that privatization does not affect resource allocation unless there are restrictions on
subsidies. However, they assume that subsidies continue to be provided to unprofitable but
not profitable firms after privatization and show that profitable firms are more likely to lay
off surplus workers after privatization. In this context SV (p. 1023) argue that
“...potentially profitable firms are the best candidates for privatization, since they refuse to
dissipate their profits on excess employment, whereas the hopeless firms continue getting
                                                                                                                                                                    
inefficiencies; see for example Demsetz and Lehn (1985).21
subsidized.”  Thus an implication of the SV model is that more profitable firms are the
best candidates for early privatization in terms of improving allocative efficiency and
minimizing the political cost of unemployment.
21
2.2.6 Minimizing political cost (GHS4)
In this section we develop an alternative model to SV to investigate the effect of
firm characteristics on post-privatization layoffs. We assume that the government is
concerned about political costs brought about by layoffs and rising unemployment after
privatization, and that state-owned enterprises are subsidized in such a way that their level
of employment is higher than the efficient employment level. In particular, we assume that
the government subsidizes public firms by paying part of the wage rate for each firm (i.e.,
the firms effectively face a below market wage rate). The subsidized wage rate is assumed
to be determined by the government’s revenue constraint and by what would normally be
a market-clearing wage.  Hence profit maximizing state-owned firms choose a higher level
of employment at the subsidized wage than they would at the market-clearing wage.
Consistent with the perceived experience of most Central European economies
that have imposed tighter budget constraints during the reform process, we make the
simplifying assumption that after privatization subsidies stop so that firms face the market
wage rate. However our results would continue to hold even if the government continues
to subsidize firms after privatization, so long as these subsidies are lower, and therefore
firms face a higher wage rate, after privatization. Since firms pay the market wage after
                                                       
21 As SV point out, this prediction is consistent with anecdotal evidence from Russia that potentially
profitable firms are more likely to reorganize and lay off workers. Accordingly, the question arises as to22
privatization, they lay off surplus labor. These layoffs in turn impose a political cost since
rising unemployment can result in lost voter support for the government and its reform
policies. The magnitude of these costs depends on the labor demand conditions in the
economy: high unemployment rates at the regional or the industry levels reduce the
number of jobs available to laid-off workers, which in turn implies higher political costs. In
this context, we investigate (i) the equilibrium choice of employment before and after
privatization in firms that face differing marginal product of labor conditions, and (ii) how
differences in firm characteristics may affect the decisions of a government that wants to
minimize layoffs.
Assume that the production function of a typical state-owned firm being
considered for privatization is given by F(L) = c1L – (a L
 2 /2) + c2  , F' > 0 and  F" < 0.
Assume further that c1 and c2 are constant across firms, while a > 0 (the slope of the
marginal product of labor function) varies across firms.
22  Suppose further that before
privatization all firms face the same subsidized wage rate given by w
s. We denote the
market wage rate after privatization to be w
m where 0 < w
s < w
m;  the government
subsidizes public firms by paying the difference between w
m and w
s. Normalizing product
price to be equal to one, we write the profit function for a typical state-owned firm prior
to privatization as:
P  =  F(L) - w
s L, (2.6.1)
where L is the level of employment chosen by the state-owned firm before privatization.
The profit function is maximized with respect to L.
                                                                                                                                                                    
how this outcome is actually achieved in their framework: it would appear necessary to include another23
Totally differentiating the first order conditions with respect to w
s and L we obtain
dL / dw
s = F"(L)
 -1 = -1/a < 0. (2.6.2)
Equation (2.6.2) indicates that if the wage rate rises, the decrease in employment will be
greater for firms with flatter marginal product of labor curves, i.e. firms that face smaller
values of a.  Hence a government concerned with minimizing layoffs would prefer to
privatize firms with steeper marginal product of labor curves (higher a’s), since these
firms are likely to lay off fewer workers after privatization. Below, we show that more
profitable firms will have steeper marginal product of labor curves.
In order to investigate the impact of a firm’s profitability on the level of layoffs,
note that a profit maximizing state-owned firm will choose a level of employment L so
that F'(L) = w
s. From the first order conditions for profit maximization it follows that the
equilibrium levelof L chosen by this firm is given by
L
*  = (c1 - w
s) / a . (2.6.3)
To investigate the effect on profits of a change in the slope, a, of the marginal
product function, we write c1 in terms of L
* and a, so  c1  = w
s + aL
*. Substituting the
parameters of the marginal product of labor function into the equilibrium profit function of
the public firm yields
P*  = F(L
*) - w
s L
* = a (L
*)
2 / 2 + (w
s + a L
*) L
* + c2 - w
s. (2.6.4)
Examining the effect of a change in the slope of the marginal product function of labor on
the equilibrium profit function of the firm we find that
                                                                                                                                                                    
internal or external participant (e.g. the International Monetary Fund) in the model.
22 We omit the firm subscript for expositional simplicity.24
dP* / da = 3/2 (L
*)
2  ‡ 0. (2.6.5)
Thus firms with steeper marginal product of labor curves (higher a terms) are also the
more profitable firms. Since, as shown in equation (2.6.2), firms with steeper marginal
product of labor functions also lay off fewer workers, this implies that a government
minimizing political costs due to post-privatization layoffs will prefer to privatize more
profitable firms because they are likely to lay off fewer workers after privatization.
As mentioned earlier, the extent to which political costs affect the government’s
decision will depend on several factors, including the labor demand conditions facing laid-
off workers. If the unemployment rate is low, then minimizing layoffs will not be an
important objective for the government. In our empirical work we measure the importance
of the political cost objective relative to other government priorities using a variable
measuring labor demand conditions at the industry level, since information on the regional
location of firms is unavailable in our data.
Before we proceed to the data and empirical analysis, we discuss briefly the salient
characteristics of the Czech privatization process.
2.3. Background of the Czech Privatization Program
23
                                                       
23 See Kotrba (1995) for a detailed description of the privatization program.25
In January 1990 the Czech Republic, as part of the former Czechoslovakia, started
its transition to a market economy from a position of virtually total state ownership. In
1989 only 1.2% of the labor force and 2% of all registered assets belonged to the private
sector, and in 1990 only 4% of the GDP was attributed to the private sector.
24  Yet by the
end of 1994, approximately 80% of all assets had been privatized as a result of three main
initiatives. First, between 1990 and 1991, shops, restaurants, housing, and other properties
valued in total between 75 and 125 billion Czech crowns ($2.5 - $4.2 billion) were
transferred to previous owners. Second, small firms in retail trade, catering and other
services were privatized between 1991 and 1993, mostly through auctions. Property
valued at about 30 billion Czech crowns ($1 billion) was privatized in this small-scale
program.
25  Third, the most important method by which the bulk of state-owned
enterprises were privatized was the large-scale privatization program, accounting for
about 900 billion Czech crowns ($30 billion) in asset value. The large-scale privatization
program occurred in two waves, with the first wave taking place between 1992 and 1993,
and the second wave between 1993 and 1995. Virtually all medium and large enterprises
were privatized in this program. Large-scale privatization generally involved the transfer
of some shares at subsidized prices through vouchers
26 and selling other shares at market
prices. In our empirical work we focus on which firms were privatized in the first wave of
the large-scale privatization program, among those privatized in both waves. In the first
wave, the privatization projects were approved at the end of April 1992, the bidding for
                                                       
24 Dyba and Svejnar (1995).
25 Czechoslovakia Statistical Bulletin, 1991-1992.
26 For an early analysis of investor behavior in the voucher privatization program, see Hingorani, Lehn
and Makhija (1997).26
shares allocated to vouchers took place between May and December 1992, and shares
were made available to new owners at the end of May 1993 (Kotrba, 1995).
27
2.4. Data, Specification and Empirical Results
Our data initially contained quarterly and annual data on the population of all
industrial firms with 25 or more workers, approximately 2500 firms. The data were
reported by firms to the Czech Statistical Office and contain information from balance
sheets and profit and loss statements. The reported variables include sales, production,
employment, average wages, total wage expenditures, and 2-digit industry classification
(NACE). Region identification is not available.
From this data we exclude approximately 750 firms that were privatized in the
small-scale privatization program.
28  We also exclude about 250 cooperatives and 37
electric and water utility companies.
29  This leaves a sample of 1470 firms that went
through the large-scale privatization program. For the purposes of our analysis, we need
annual and first quarter 1992 values for sales, value of output, average wages, labor force,
accounting profits, and industry classification for each firm. After deleting firms with
missing values, we obtain our sample of 1121 firms. Of these firms, 664 were privatized in
the first wave of the large-scale privatization process, while 457 were privatized in the
                                                       
27 In the second wave of the voucher privatization program, the projects were approved by the end of
October 1993, the bidding for shares took place between April and October 1994, and shares were
transferred to new owners starting in February 1995.
28 We considered including the small scale firms as privatized firms in our analysis, but examination of
the data indicated that they were very different from the firms privatized in the large scale program.
29 Cooperatives were not privatized in the large scale privatization program which is the focus of our
analysis. Electric and water utilities were retained under state ownership and not considered for
privatization throughout the privatization process.   27
second wave. Firms to be privatized in the first wave were chosen by the end of April,
1992,
30 although new owners could not take possession until the end of May of 1993.
We estimate probit equations where the dependent variable is coded one if a firm
was privatized in the first wave and zero if it was privatized in the second wave. Our goal
is to assess the predictions of the theories discussed in Section 2, and we choose our
explanatory variables with this in mind.
31  Some of these variables refer to the firm’s
industry while others are specific to the firm. In order to ensure that the explanatory
variables capture firm performance before the firms were turned over to new owners
starting in the spring and summer of 1993, we use 1992 annual values for the firm-specific
independent variables (we do not have data prior to the first quarter of 1992). There may
be a potential endogeneity problem for some of the firm-specific explanatory variables if
the values of these variables are affected by the knowledge of whether the firm will be
privatized in the first wave. (As noted above, this information became available in May
1992.)
 32  Note, however, that the values of these variables would not be affected by the
future owners since the actual transfer of shares to new owners did not occur until May
1993 or later. Based on existing evidence we do not expect much restructuring to have
occurred prior to privatization in 1992, and therefore do not anticipate this type of
endogeneity in the data. However, to address this issue we also use two-stage methods to
                                                       
30 To be precise, we classify firms as privatized if they changed their legal registration from state-owned to
joint stock company by the second quarter of 1992.
31 Our estimating equations may be interpreted as reflecting an overall government objective function that
weighs the various objectives discussed earlier. In particular, the government may be thought of as having
an overall objective function which weighs the utility of competing groups, and the utility of each group
depends on some or all of the explanatory variables that we use. See for example Svejnar (1982), and
Prasnikar et al. (1994), especially section IV.
32 Note, however, that Aghion, et al. (1994) and Blanchard (1997) argue (and the existing empirical
literature suggests) that restructuring prior to privatization was rare either due to opposition from worker28
estimate our model. In this approach we treat the annual 1992 firm-specific variables as
endogenous, and use observations on firm-specific variables from the first quarter of 1992
as instrumental variables.
33
The predictions of the models discussed in section 2 are summarized in Table 1.
The revenue maximization (GHS1), public good will (GHS2), SV, and political cost
(GHS4) models predict that the government will want to sell the more profitable firms
first. To test the predictions of these models we use (separately) annual 1992 values of
three alternative variables as indicators of profitability: PROFIT (accounting profits); Q -
W (difference between the value of output and the total wage bill); and Q/L - W/L
(difference between the value of average product and the average wage) where Q is value
of output, L is employment and W is the total wage bill.
34  The three variables complement
one another in that accounting profit captures all input costs but may be subject to
reporting error, while Q – W and Q/L – W/L underestimate total cost but get directly at
the relationship between revenues and labor cost. We also use an explanatory variable
MKSHARE, measuring the firm’s market share in the industry (ratio of firm sales to
industry sales) as a proxy for profitability, since it is expected to be positively correlated to
                                                                                                                                                                    
coalitions or because restructuring would require investment and reorganization which was beyond the
scope of the workers and managers of public firms.
33 Specifically, we predict in a first stage equation the potentially endogenous firm-specific annual 1992
variables using observations from the first quarter of 1992 as excluded explanatory variables. (Recall that
the decision to privatize firms was not made until the second quarter of 1992). All exogenous RHS
variables from the second stage probit estimations are also included in the first stage. Note that we are
focusing only on endogeneity caused by firms restructuring before the end of 1992 based on the
information in May 1992 that they will or will not be privatized in the First Wave.
34 We could probably increase the explanatory power of the equation by simultaneously
including all three profit variables in the specification. However, this would also lead to multicollinearity
problems, and thus we have not estimated such an equation.29
current and future profitability.
35  These models predict that indicators of profitability
(PROFIT, Q - W, Q/L - W/L, and MKSHARE) should have positive coefficients.
We test our static efficiency model (GHS3) using (Q/L - W/L) as an explanatory
variable. According to this model, the estimated coefficient on this variable should be
negative, since firms in which wages most exceed marginal productivity of labor are likely
to benefit the most from restructuring. As mentioned earlier, Q/L is used as a proxy for
marginal productivity since we cannot measure marginal product in our data and the two
variables are positively correlated. Alternatively, one can also view the static efficiency
model as predicting that firms with the largest (negative) difference between value of
output and total wage bill, or the greatest dollar losses, should be privatized first. Thus the
static efficiency model has exactly the opposite predictions for our three profit variables
than the political cost and revenue and public goodwill maximization models.
We test the GS predictions regarding which industries should be privatized early to
reap the informational gains from privatization, by creating two dummy variables to
capture the firms that face the greatest demand uncertainty. The first variable is CMEA,
which is coded one for industries most affected by the break-up of the Soviet common
trading area known as the CMEA and zero otherwise.
36  To identify industries that faced
demand uncertainty due to the collapse of the CMEA, we selected industries that
                                                       
35 Specifically, we calculate the ratio of firm sales to industry sales in the Czech Republic.
36 Analyzing the effect of demand uncertainty is relevant because of what is known as the CMEA shock.
The trading system between the countries of the Soviet Bloc (CMEA) was disintegrating since 1989 and
was eventually dismantled in 1991, resulting in a collapse of trade. The aggregate numbers show that
exports between Central European countries fell 25% between 1989 and 1990 and were still 13% lower
than the previous year in 1993. Similarly, imports from other Central European countries to
Czechoslovakia fell over 25% in 1991, and continued to fall through 1993. The trend is similar for
exports between Central European countries and the former Soviet Union. Industries that relied heavily on
exports to these other markets experienced considerable demand uncertainty after the collapse of the trade
agreements.30
experienced declining exports and output after 1991 using evidence from the Czech
Statistical Yearbooks and the detailed discussion on this issue in Bohata et al. (1995). The
industries included in this category are mining of non-energy materials, mining of metal
ores, other mining, textiles, wood products, pulp and paper products, and other non-
metallic mineral products. Our second dummy variable is DOWN, which is coded one for
downstream (processed goods) industries and zero otherwise. The DOWN category
includes food, tobacco, textiles, leather, footwear, paper, publishing, electronic machinery
and equipment, and transportation.
37  GS argue that firms in the CMEA and DOWN
industries should be privatized first, since these firms are likely to benefit the most from
increased responsiveness to information about demand conditions after privatization.
38
Finally, to test their proposition that firms with greater monopoly power should not be
privatized early since they offer lower efficiency gains from privatization, we use
MKSHARE as an explanatory variable. According to the GS model, the coefficients of
CMEA and DOWN should be positive and that of MKSHARE should be negative.  We
also note that by assuming that MKSHARE is positively correlated with future profits, the
GHS1-2, SV, and GHS4 models have the opposite prediction for the sign of this variable
than the GS model, allowing us to investigate the relative priority placed on efficiency by
the government.
In order to examine whether the political cost of unemployment may be driving the
government’s sequencing strategy, as assumed in the political cost model (GHS4), we use
                                                       
37 We choose these firms following the discussion in GS.
38 While we also wanted to include a variable for industries facing cost uncertainty, since GS recommend
that these firms are also good candidates for early privatization, we could not obtain statistical evidence on
this issue and the anecdotal evidence was not found to be consistent. However, since the primary source of31
the industry employment growth rate between 1991 and 1992 (EMPGR) as a proxy for
labor demand conditions in the industry.
39  The political cost model produces an
unambiguous prediction that the coefficient on this variable should be positive, (i.e.
stronger labor demand conditions increase the probability of privatization). As noted
above, Table 1 contains a summary of the predictions of the theoretical models developed
in section 2 and lists the variables used to test the predictions.
We start by estimating the following probit equation:
yi* = b0 + b1 CMEA + b2 DOWN + b3 (Q/L - W/L)i + b4 MKSHAREi + b5 EMPGR + ei.(4.1)
where the i subscript is used to represent firm specific variables, ei has a standard normal
distribution and yi
* is a latent index such that a firm is privatized if yi
* is greater than zero.
As described earlier, CMEA and DOWN are dummy variables which indicate the firms
most likely to experience large demand shocks, and firms in downstream industries
respectively, and thus allow us to test the predictions of the GS model.  In equation (4.1)
we use (Q/L – W/L) i and MKSHAREi as measures of firm profitability.
40  The GHS1-2,
GHS4 and the SV models predict that these variables will have a positive coefficient,
while the static Pareto efficiency model GHS3 predicts that (Q/L – W/L) i will have a
negative coefficient. Also, the MKSHARE i variable should have a negative coefficient
                                                                                                                                                                    
uncertainty facing firms in transition economies has been fluctuating demand conditions, both the CMEA
and DOWN variables capture one of the most significant sources of uncertainty affecting these firms.
39 In the data we do not observe the region in which the firm is located and thus cannot use the regional
unemployment rate, which could be a better indicator of labor demand conditions. Industry unemployment
rates are also unavailable.
40 In what follows we use an ‘i’ subscript to distinguish firm specific variables from industry specific
variables.32
according to GS. Finally, EMPGR measures labor demand conditions in the context of the
political cost model.
To test the sensitivity of our results to the measure used for profits (or static
inefficiency), in (4.2) below we replace (Q/L – W/L) i with (Q – W) i, while retaining
MKSHAREi in the specification
yi* = a0 + a1 CMEA + a2 DOWN + a3 (Q – W)i + a4 MKSHAREi + a5 EMPGR + ui.   (4.2)
Finally, to further investigate the sensitivity of our results to the choice of firm variables, in
equation (4.3) below we replace (Q– W)i with accounting profits PROFITi:
yi*  = g0 + g1 CMEA + g2 DOWN + g3 PROFITi + g4 MKSHAREi + g5 EMPGR + vi.        (4.3)
In Table 2 we present the mean 1992 values of the explanatory variables. Column
1 contains the values for all firms, while columns 2 and 3 contain the values for the firms
privatized during the first wave (“first wave”) and the firms privatized in the second wave
(“second wave”) respectively. Column 4 contains the t-statistic for the null hypothesis that
the mean values in columns 2 and 3 are equal. Note that firms privatized in the first wave
are, on average, located more in downstream industries and have higher average values of
profits, average product minus average wage, value of output minus wage bill, and market
share. Firms privatized in the first wave are also more likely to have been affected by the
collapse of the CMEA, but the difference between the first and second wave firms is not
statistically significant. Finally, note that there is very little difference in mean industrial
employment growth between the two types of firms.33
The results in Table 2 are quite suggestive but we still need to use multivariate
analysis to investigate the factors determining privatization. Our results for the
specifications given by equations (4.1)-(4.3) are contained in Table 3.  In the first three
columns we treat 1992 annual firm-specific variables as exogenous, while in columns 4, 5
and 6 we treat the annual 1992 firm-specific variables as endogenous, using the first
quarter 1992 firm specific variables as instrumental variables.
In column 1 of Table 3, both CMEA and DOWN have positive and statistically
significant coefficients, as predicted by the GS model. The coefficient of the variable
measuring the difference between the value of average product of labor and the average
wage has a positive sign and is also statistically significant. This result is consistent with
the government setting priorities on maximizing privatization revenues and or public
goodwill (in the case of subsidized transfers).
41  It is also consistent with the political cost
and SV models. However, the results are inconsistent with the government maximizing
static Pareto efficiency. Recall that the coefficient on the market share variable captures
two effects. While in the GS model efficiency is promoted if firms with monopoly power
are not privatized early, this variable may also act as a proxy for profitability. If the first
effect dominates, we would expect the coefficient to be negative, while if the second effect
dominates, we would expect the coefficient to be positive. We find a positive coefficient
on market share, suggesting that the profit effect dominates. Finally, the coefficient on the
industry employment growth variable, which measures labor demand conditions and thus
acts as a proxy for political costs, is not statistically significant at standard confidence
levels. This result suggests that the extremely low level of unemployment in the Czech
                                                       
41 Recall that the privatization of most firms in the large-scale privatization program involved both34
Republic made the political costs of high unemployment, as proxied by labor demand
conditions, relatively unimportant. By privatizing more profitable firms first, the
government appears to be placing a priority on maximizing privatization revenues and
public goodwill and not on the political costs of unemployment.
In column 2 of Table 3 we use market share and the difference between the value
of total output and the wage bill as proxies for profitability. These results are quite similar
to those of column 1.  In column 3 we replace the difference between the value of total
output and the wage bill with accounting profits. The results are again very similar to
those in columns 1 and 2.
42  Thus each possible measure of profitability has a positive and
statistically significant coefficient, although accounting profits are significant only at the
10% level. Columns 4, 5 and 6 contain the results when the annual 1992 firm-specific
variables are treated as endogenous. The results are similar to those in columns 1 through
3, suggesting that potential endogeneity due to firms restructuring in anticipation of being
privatized is not a problem in the data. The only real difference in the results is that the
coefficient on accounting profits doubles in size and, with the standard error rising only
slightly, it becomes much more statistically significant.
Finally, to examine the possibility that equations (4.1) – (4.3) are too rich to
identify the effect of the employment growth variable EMPGR (proxying the role of
political costs), we next consider a narrower specification that eliminates the industry
dummy variables CMEA and DOWN.  These results are contained in Table 4.  As before,
in columns 1 through 3 of Table 4 we treat the annual firm-specific variables as
                                                                                                                                                                    
subsidized transfers as well as unsubsidized sales of shares.35
exogenous, while in columns 4 through 6 we consider them to be endogenous.  The
results are similar to those in Table 3, except that the coefficient on accounting profits is
statistically significant only when the firm-specific variables are treated as endogenous.
43
Moreover, the employment growth variable remains statistically insignificant.  Hence while
the model of political costs predicted that profitable firms would be privatized if the
government were minimizing layoffs, political costs do not appear to have had a significant
impact on the government.  Thus, the predictions of the privatization revenues and public
goodwill maximization models appear to be more consistent with the data than the
political cost model. Of course, political costs may be more important in the other
transitional economies, which had much higher rates of unemployment during this
period.
44
For the sake of completeness, we have also estimated probit equations using the
first quarter of 1992 data for the firm specific variables, rather than annual 1992 data for
these variables. In Appendix Table A2 we report these results for the case where we
include CMEA and DOWN, while in Table A3 we report the results for the case when we
exclude them. These estimates for these specifications are similar to those based on annual
                                                                                                                                                                    
42 One could argue that variables such as PROFITi or (Q-W) i may simply be picking up a size effect,
although none of our models predict such an effect. We argue that this is not the case since the results are
very similar when we use (Q/L-W/L) i , which is independent of firm size.
43 However, the coefficient on profit in column 3 of Table 4 is highly statistically significant when the
variable measuring market share is excluded.
44 As noted  above, the Czech unemployment rate was low and stable over the period 1991-1995. Since we
use labor market conditions between 1991 and 1992, our results are not simply the result of the
government incorporating political costs in the large scale privatization program. However, the low
unemployment rate before the large scale privatization program may reflect an earlier concern with
political costs, and we may simply not have enough variation in industrial employment growth to identify
the effect of this variable.36
data (reported in the text), differing only in the fact that the coefficient on accounting
profits is not statistically significant.
45
                                                       
45 An alternative motivation for the IV procedure would be to assume that policy makers use the expected
value of the firm specific variables conditional on information available in May 1992. In this case the
error term will contain an expectational error. If we had panel data with a reasonably long time series
dimension, we could invoke rational expectations to argue that the first quarter variables are uncorrelated
with the expectational error. However, since we only have a cross-section, we cannot appeal to rational
expectations. Thus if readers believe that this expectations model is more appropriate, then the estimates
in Tables A2 and A3 will be of most interest. Note that we would expect the coefficients in Tables A2 and
A3 to be larger simply because the first quarter firm specific variables are smaller than the annual values
of these variables.37
2.5. Conclusion
Our empirical evidence suggests that governments sequence the privatization of
firms strategically rather than randomly. In particular, we find strong evidence that the
Czech government privatized first firms that were more profitable, firms in downstream
industries, and firms in industries subject to greater demand uncertainty.
Privatizing more profitable firms first is consistent with our model of the
government maximizing privatization revenues and/or public goodwill through a
subsidized sale of shares. This outcome is also consistent with Shleifer and Vishny’s
(1994) prediction that the government will privatize profitable firms first if political
concerns about employment are offset by other government objectives. Our results are not
consistent with a government placing priority on improving Pareto efficiency by
privatizing first firms with the largest gap between the wage and the marginal product of
labor. Our finding that firms in downstream industries and in industries with greater
demand uncertainty were more likely to be privatized early suggests that the government
placed emphasis on efficiency in the Glaeser and Scheinkman (1996) sense, namely by
privatizing first firms that were likely to benefit the most from greater responsiveness to
market conditions. However, in contrast to the GS recommendation but consistent with
the general evidence regarding profitability, firms with higher market share were more
likely to be privatized first. Finally, our estimates indicate that political costs of
unemployment, as measured by employment growth in the firm’s industry, were not an
important priority for the Czech government. This suggests that the government did not
privatize more profitable firms first in order to minimize these political costs, but rather to
maximize revenues and public goodwill.38
The decision to privatize a firm may be the result of bargaining between the
government and buyers and managers of firms.  Since we observe ex-post privatization
outcomes we would not be able to identify strategic behavior by the government. As in
Svejnar (1982) and Prasnikar (1994) one can then think of the government’s objective
function as a weighted function of the utility of competing agents in the privatization
process. However, while there may have been some lobbying by firms, the Czech
government had direct control over the sequence in which firms were privatized. In
particular, it was not voluntary on the part of firms to participate in privatization, nor
could they choose when they were to be privatized. Thus, identification does not seem to
be an issue.
In addition to providing key evidence on the nature of the privatization process,
our results have important implications for studies evaluating the effect of privatization.
These evaluations compare the performance of privatized firms with that of non-privatized
firms, usually assuming that privatization is random, at least after controlling for
observables. However, our analysis indicates that more profitable firms were being
privatized first, suggesting that such firms may have both observable and unobservable
characteristics which make them likely to perform better after privatization.   
Thus, evaluation studies of the effect of privatization need to account for this potential
selection bias, since otherwise they may provide upwardly biased estimates of the effect of
privatization on firm performance.39
Table 1
 Summary Table of Theoretical Predictions
Theory Variables Sign(s)
GHS1 (Maximizing privatization revenues)
A government that is informed about the quality of the
firms being sold and wishes to maximize privatization
revenues will sell the more profitable firms first.
(Q/L - W/L)i
(value of average product - average
wage)
(Q – W)i






GHS2 (Maximizing public goodwill)
A government concerned with public goodwill from free
transfers of shares to citizens will privatize more profitable
firms first.
Same as above All Positive
GHS3 (Maximizing static Pareto efficiency)
Inefficient firms are likely to benefit most from
restructuring and privatization, hence firms in which






GS (Maximizing efficiency through informational
gains of privatization)
GS’s theory of efficiency argues that informational gains
from privatization will be higher if firms that are subject to
large demand shocks are privatized early.
GS’s model predicts that informational gains would also be
higher from privatizing downstream industries early.
GS argue that privatizing firms with high market share can
decrease efficiency by creating monopolies.
CMEA







SV (Increasing allocative efficiency)
When subsidies after privatization are limited to
unprofitable firms, competing government objectives may






GHS4 (Minimizing political cost)
More profitable firms are likely to have fewer layoffs.
Hence, a government which faces high political costs
should privatize more profitable firms first.
If the government is concerned with political costs due to
layoffs after privatization, this model predicts that a lower
unemployment or higher employment growth rate in the
industry will increase the probability of being privatized.
same as above
EMPGR
(employment growth rate in





Means of Principal Variables in 1992 by Firms’ Privatization Status
(Standard deviations of means are in parentheses.)





Ho: (2) = (3)




















































                 -0.286
Number of observations 1121 664 457                   -
Note 1 - Profits, value of total output, wage bill, firm sales, and industry sales are measured in billions of
Czech crowns, where 1 U.S. Dollar was equal to about 30 Czech crowns at the time. The firm specific
variables are calculated using annual 1992 observations, and are denoted by an i subscript.
Note 2 - * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.41
41
Table 3
Estimating the Probability of Being Privatized
Dependent variable equals one if the firm is privatized in the First Wave.
Firm-specific RHS variables are annual 1992 observations.
(Standard errors are in parentheses.)
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6
CMEA   0.164*
(0.092)










DOWN       0.236***
(0.086)
       0.268***
 (0.086)
      0.265***
(0.086)
       0.236***
 (0.086)
       0.266***
 (0.086)
      0.265***
(0.086)




    3.16***
(0.973)
    3.16***
 (0.942)
    1.97**
(1.04)














(Q/L - W/L)i x 10
-4   2.01**
(0.860)
- -   1.85**
 (0.905)
- -
 (Q – W)i x  10
-7 -       2.70***
  (0.814)




-7 - -  4.72*
(3.36)
- -     9.27**
(4.36)
Note - In columns 1 - 3 the firm-specific variables are treated as exogenous. In columns 4 - 6, the firm-
specific variables are treated as endogenous. The first stage results are reported in Appendix Table A1. A
constant is included but not reported.  The sample contains 1121 firms. See notes to Table 2.42
42
Table 4
Estimating the Probability of Being Privatized in a Simpler Model
Dependent variable equals one if the firm is privatized in the First Wave.
Firm-specific RHS variables are annual 1992 observations.
(Standard errors are in parentheses.)
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6




    2.96***
(0.965)


















(Q/L - W/L)i x 10
-4      2.14***
 (0.860)




-7 -       2.53***
  (0.807)




-7 - - 3.60
(3.30)
- -   8.06*
(4.29)
Note - See notes to Tables 2 and 3.